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1. Introduction 
The most significant value added by Euro 2012 is undoubtedly the infrastructural changes. 
The event became a catalyst for the execution of more than two hundred projects for an 
amount of ca. PLN 100 billion. This paper focuses on the key projects, including above all the 
road construction projects, as well as those connected to air and rail infrastructure. 
 
2. The model of financing of Euro 2012 in Poland and in other UEFA European 
Championships hosts – comparative analysis 
Poland's participation in the organisation of UEFA European Championships in 2012 is a 
pretext to attempt to determine whether the commitment of public funds in such major 
events is justified. The issue of financing mega sports events has been the subject of 
comprehensive analyses presented in foreign literature. For obvious reasons, this subject has 
not yet been taken up in Poland, although both Euro 2012 and any potential mega sports 
events that may be organised in future, given the present infrastructure, have contributed to 
a change in this trend.  
Table 3.1 contains an overall comparison of the expenses incurred in the framework of 
preparations for UEFA European Championships organised in 2000–2012. In terms of the 
structure of financing, two models can be identified: public and private. In nearly all 
countries private funds have been committed, with the exception of Poland, where the 
outlays were financed exclusively from public sources. It was in spite of huge hopes placed in 
public-private partnership [Zawadzki, 2010, pp. 606–616].  
The fact of financing from a single source compounds the massive size of the outlays. In this 
respect the event in Poland was among the most expensive ones. Its total cost was in excess 
of 22.5 billion EUR2012.
1
 This is at odds with the assumption presented in the subchapter 2.3 
that the most expensive events necessitate funding from a variety of both public and private 
                                                          
1 The EUR2012 unit was used to reflect as accurately as possible the expenditures incurred by the 
individual countries [Zawadzki, 2013, pp. 613–615]. 
sources. For comparison, the co-organiser of UEFA Euro 2012 – Ukraine spent less than a 
sixth of that amount on preparations for the event. Among the cheapest were the 
tournaments organised at the turn of the century in Belgium and the Netherlands. The overall 
amount allocated to the preparations in both countries was less than half a billion EUR2012. 
The tournament organised in Austria and Switzerland should also be considered cheap. It cost 
each of the countries around half a billion EUR2012. This confirms the hypothesis of lower 
infrastructure expenditures in countries with more developed economies. During UEFA Euro 
in 2000 and 2008 the event hosts, being some of the most developed European countries, 
focused on preparing the stadiums and their immediate surroundings. In Poland, Portugal 
and Ukraine organisation of such a major sporting event became an excuse for execution of 
a series of infrastructural projects related to sports venues only to a small extent.  
 
Table 3.1. 
Size and structure of financing of UEFA European Championships, broken down into public 
and private sources 
 
Place and time 
Financing 
[EUR2012bn] 
 Participation In 
funding [%] 
public private total public private 
Belgium 2000 0.09 0.103 0.193   47 53 
The Netherlands 2000 0.078 0.202 0.280   28 72 
Portugal 2004 3.4 0.6 4.0   85 15 
Austria 2008 0.4045 0.023 0.4275   95   5 
Switzerland 2008 0.303 0.230 0.533   57 43 
Poland 2012 22.503 0 22.503 100   0 
Ukraine 2012 2.97 0.72 3.69   80 20 
 
Source: [Zawadzki, 2013, p. 615]. 
 
Although the stadiums were among the most important projects completed in Poland as 
part of Euro 2012, they accounted for a relatively small part of the total expenditure on key 
investments – under 6% (Table 3.2). Non-sports infrastructure was of a far greater 
significance here, above all, road infrastructure, which accounted for more than 80% of the 
outlays. 
Since the execution of a great proportion of infrastructure projects in countries with less 
developed economies is accelerated due to the event but the projects would be completed 
in the future regardless, it is difficult to compare the cases of the individual host countries in 
terms of overall expenditures made in connection of UEFA Euro tournaments. As shown in 
Table 3.1, the scale of variance is enormous. The “most expensive” UEFA European 
Championships in Poland ate up more than 116 times funds than the “cheapest” ones in 
Belgium. But to determine the actual scale of financing of an event it would be necessary to 
isolate only the projects executed exclusively for UEFA Euro and disregard the ones for 
which the event was only a catalyst. 
 
Table 3.2.  
Expenditure on key investments as part of preparations for Euro 2012 in Poland  
 
place 
stadium 
infrastru
cture 
road 
transpo
rt 
rail 
transpo
rt 
air  
transpo
rt 
public 
transport 
other 
infrastruc
ture 
Gdańsk 921.21 
1 
569.15 
0 306.60 0 19 
Poznań 638.58 151.83 0 222.50 0 0 
Warsaw 1 914.63 0 0 0 0 84 
Wrocław 857.42 890.24 0 503.25 760 0 
entire state 0 
60 
003.80 
8 
042.70 
206.69 0 0 
Total 
million 
PLN 
4 331.84 
62 
615.03 
8 
042.70 
1 
239.04 
760 103 
% 5.62 81.22 10.43 1.61 0.99 0.13 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on: Sprawozdanie z realizacji przedsięwzięć Euro 
2012 oraz z wykonanych działań dotyczących realizacji przygotowań Polski do finałowego 
turnieju Mistrzostw Europy w Piłce Nożnej UEFA Euro 2012 (styczeń 2012 – czerwiec 2012), 
Ministry of Sport and Tourism, Warsaw 2012 pp.24-42. 
 
Therefore, western specialist literature usually refers to the expenses incurred solely with 
the purpose of preparing the sports venues [Feddersen et al., 2008]. Opponents of this 
approach invariably point to the fact that highly developed countries usually already have 
the necessary stadiums and are not forced to build them from scratch. Moreover, the 
construction of an arena generally increases the competitiveness of a particular region after 
the event, so the expenses incurred during its creation will be offset by potential income 
from its operation. Despite the aforementioned reservations, such an approach seems far 
more reliable than a comprehensive approach, taking into consideration multiple road, rail 
or air infrastructure projects. As shown in Figure 3.1, focusing exclusively on the financing of 
sports venues greatly reduces the scale of financing. The most substantial expenditures, 
incurred by Ukraine, amount to 1,093 billion EUR2012. It also reduces the difference between 
the “most expensive” and “cheapest” event. A comparison of the expenses incurred by the 
individual countries as part of the same (co-organisers) and different events gives rise to 
some interesting conclusions.  
The event in Ukraine, although generating the largest expenditures, is not regarded as the 
most expensive in view of the high share (over 40%) of funds from private sources for the 
construction of the Donetsk and Kharkov. These venues were prepared efficiently and 
without any serious disruptions and were put in operation as early as in 2009. However, the 
execution of the stadiums for public funds was far from trouble-free. As a result of the 
increasing costs and repeated postponement of completion dates, the Olympic Stadium in 
Kiev was completed in mid-2011, and the venue in Lvov was not ready until November 2011, 
following a decisive intervention of the Ukrainian government and public prosecutor's office. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Scale and structure of financing of sports venues in the framework of UEFA Euro 
in 2000–2012 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
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 The venues in Poland, wholly financed from public sources, have given rise to much 
controversy and social discontent. Opponents of such a model of funding often argue that 
that the venues are now being used by sports clubs owned by private investors. This applies 
to the stadiums in Gdańsk, Poznań and Wrocław. 
It is noteworthy that the outlays made by Poland and Ukraine are far higher than those 
incurred by Portugal despite the relatively similar level of economic  
development and the fact that the Iberian country prepared ten stadiums, including six 
funded from public sources, for an amount of 0,441 billion EUR2012 (all ten for 0,8 billion 
EUR2012). This might indicate a steady increase in the cost of sports venue construction, 
whose dynamics exceeds the HICP index level assumed in the calculations of the EUR2012 
unit. 
To sum up the aspect of financing the stadium infrastructure outlays, there is a striking 
contrast between the wealthier countries, allocating relatively modest funds to this purpose, 
usually upgrading existing venues, and the poorer countries, not having the required 
infrastructure base and forced to build sports venues from scratch. The issue of the structure 
of financing is more ambiguous, although, with the exception of Austria, it may be ventured 
that better developed countries are more willing to use private sources, whereas public and 
mixed sources dominate in less economically developed countries.  
It would be difficult to judge at this stage whether such a high share of public funding was 
justified in the case of Poland. A matter of great importance will be the utilisation of existing 
infrastructure, including the stadiums which, if managed inefficiently, will continue to be a 
burden to the cities' budgets in the future. This issue is described in more detail in chapter 
four. 
3. Degree of completion of the projects undertaken as part of preparations for 
Euro 2012 
The fact of entrusting organisation of one of the world’s largest sport events to Poland gave 
rise to the natural questions as to whether our country would be ready to take up such a 
multifront challenge. Particular anxiety accompanied the condition of the infrastructure and 
the scale of the necessary actions to improve it. The only elements which appeared to be of 
decent quality were: the hotel infrastructure, the quantitative coverage of the Polish railway 
network, and the urban transport. All other areas required immense investments almost 
revolutionary in nature. Some economists formulated a risky, though not unsubstantiated 
thesis, that given its actual infrastructure of the year 2007 Poland would not have stood any 
chance organise the Euro efficiently even as early as in 1980 [Filip, 2010, p. 53].  
Hence, the paramount challenge the organisers faced was to carry out the necessary 
infrastructural projects. As mentioned in the subchapter 1.3, the number of the investments 
planned totalled 219. The immense scale of the investment-related works was evident to the 
legislator as early as at the stage of creating the legal framework, and the scenario of a 
possible failure to carry through the daring plans was realised. Therefore, the projects were 
arranged in three groups depending on their perceived weight. The key investments grouped 
the initiatives considered paramount in importance and indispensible for efficient 
organisation of the Euro 2012. This group includes projects connected with: 
 stadiums, 
 road infrastructure, 
 air transport, 
 rail transport, 
 public transport. 
Among the important projects were also those connected with medical care, while other 
projects also included hotel infrastructure and the preparation of team base camps. 
Table 3.3 gives an overview of the projects grouped by their designations. Apart from the 
four host cities, the projects embraced the entire country. This means, they were 
investments carried out over large areas, basically improving the transport infrastructure all 
over Poland. The largest group named “other cities” refers primarily to the accommodation 
centres dispersed all over the country, prepared to receive the national teams. Table 3.3 
reveals that out of the four host cities Wrocław was the location of most key and important 
projects planned. However, with all other investments taken into account Gdańsk takes the 
lead with its 34 projects in total. 
  
 Table 3.3.  
Number of projects implemented in preparation for the Euro 2012 in Poland,  
grouped by area  
 
Area 
Project type 
Total 
Key Important Other 
Gdańsk   7   5   22   34 
Poznań   5 11   13   29 
Warsaw   4   7     8   19 
Wrocław 11   6   11   28 
Other cities   0   0   69   69 
Poland 19   8   13   40 
Total 46 37 136 219 
 
Source: the author’s own study.  
As of day one, it was assumed that the percent of unrealised projects would be inversely 
proportional to the weight ascribed to them. In practice, it turned out that not only some of 
the ‘other’ projects, but also not all of the undertaken investments of the ‘key’ and 
‘important’ status had been completed by the opening of the European Championship. Table 
3.4 shows the degree of project`s attainment expressed in figures and percentages. The 
category of investments unfinished on time includes projects ultimately completed by the 
end of the year 2012. There were 13 projects brought to completion after their original 
deadline, including 2 of the key status, and 6 classified as important. In table 3.4, the number 
of those investments is shown in brackets.  
 
Table 3.4.  
Degree of project attainment by day one of the Euro 2012 
 
Area 
Project type 
Key Important Other 
Total 
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Gdańsk   6 1 86% 4 1 80% 15 7 (1) 68% 74% 
Poznań   4 1 80% 6 5 (1) 55%   9 4 (2) 69% 66% 
Warsaw   3 1 75% 6 1 (1) 86%   3 5 38% 63% 
Wrocław 10 1 91% 5 1 83%   4   36% 68% 
Other cities - - - - - - 32 37 (1) 46% 46% 
Poland  12 7 (2) 63% 3 5 (4) 38%  7 6 (1) 54% 55% 
Total 35 11 (2) 76% 24 13 (6) 65% 70 66 (5) 51% 59% 
 
Source: the author’s own study. 
 On the whole, however, the anticipation that the degree of project attainment would be 
proportional to the status ascribed to the specific projects has proven true. We have 
managed to complete more than ¾ of the planned key projects, but not much more than 
half of all other initiatives. Ultimately, 59 per cent of the planned projects were completed 
on time. Looking at the host cities alone, Gdańsk performed best with 74 per cent of its 
planned initiatives completed before day one of the Euro event. On the other hand, from the 
perspective of the key and important projects alone, Wrocław proved more effective with its 
respective 91 and 83 per cent plan attainment. 
Figure 3.2. The degree of attainment of individual projects related to the Euro 2012 by the 
type of the infrastructural investment 
Source: the author’s own study. 
 
When analysing the degree of project attainment against the criterion of the type of the 
infrastructural one should note cases of 100 per cent plan execution in the categories of key 
and important projects. These are found in such areas as stadium infrastructure, air 
transport, urban transport, and projects connected with medical care and safety. Moreover, 
the degree of advancement into key and important projects, if only undertaken, never fell 
below 55 per cent. The top position in this ranking belongs to the air transport-related 
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infrastructure, where the key and important projects were fully completed. The outcomes 
were worst, as could be expected, in the case of other projects. In none of the analysed 
areas was the plan fully executed, and the worst situation was noted for the railway 
infrastructure, where the attainment stopped at the mere 14 per cent (Figure 3.2).  
4. Major infrastructure changes occurring in Polish host cities in connection with 
the staging of Euro 2012 
4.1 Air transport 
Predictably, air transport played a crucial role in the tourist traffic to and from Poland. 
According to representatives of the airports in the four host cities, more than 10 000 take-
offs and landings took place during the group phase and quarterfinals (Figure 3.3). An 
overwhelming proportion of these were foreign flights, accounting for more than 82 per 
cent of all air traffic. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Use of the airports in the four host cities during Euro 2012 
 
Source: own compilation based on the data received from the administrators of Warsaw 
Chopin Airport, Gdansk Lech Walesa Airport, Wroclaw Airport, Poznan Airport. 
 
Such performance could not have been achieved without the extension of all the 
aforementioned airports, aimed at increasing their capacity and streamlining the handling of 
arriving and departing passengers (Table 3.5). 
In addition to the efforts aimed at adjusting the capacity of the Polish airports to temporarily 
increased air traffic during the event, another objective of equal importance was to meet 
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top safety standards and ensure minimum delays for traffic other than connected with Euro 
2012. Achievement of these aims was also facilitated by the introduction of new procedures 
– IAP, STAR and SID – for the individual airports. 
Table 3.5. 
 Effects of the expansion of airports in host cities 
 
City 
Before/after 
upgrading 
Capacity Operations 
Number  
of 
passengers 
arriving/hour 
Number of 
passengers 
departing/hour 
Number of  
operations/hour 
Gdańsk 
Before upgrading   760   760 23 
After upgrading 2240 2240 23 
Poznań 
Before upgrading   900   500 10 
After upgrading 1900 1100 20 
Warsaw 
Before upgrading 3750 2340 36 
After upgrading 5860 3660 38 
Wrocław 
Before upgrading 1260   840 10 
After upgrading 2240 2240 22 
 
Source: own compilation based on the data received from the administrators of Warsaw 
Chopin Airport, Gdansk Lech Walesa Airport, Wroclaw Airport, Poznan Airport. 
 
4.2. Rail transport 
During the preparations for Euro 2012, a number of projects were carried out on the rail 
network, with the aim of reducing the time of journey between the host cities and from 
border crossings to the host cities (Table 3.6). In the latter case the modernisation related to 
the links on two routes: Terespol – Warsaw and Zgorzelec – Wrocław The longest journey is 
that between Gdańsk and Wrocław. It is noteworthy that before the upgrading the journey 
time on the same route was around 8 hours. 
Table 3.6. 
Time of train journey between host cities and from border crossings to host cities  
[in hours] 
 
 Gdańsk Poznań Terespol Warsaw Wrocław Zgorzelec 
Gdańsk X 06:20 - 04:40   
Poznań 03:30 X - 02:40 02:30 - 
Terespol - - X 02:37 - - 
Warsaw 04:40 02:40 02:37 X 04:45 - 
Wrocław 06:20 02:30 - 04:45 X 01:59 
Zgorzelec - - - - 01:59 X 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Beside the track upgrading, the goal was also achieved thanks to the new rolling stock. It 
consisted of 29 Elf electric multiple units and 10 Newag electric multiple units. In addition, 
21 new train engines were added to the resources of Polish State Railways. 
An important element of improvement of Poland's image were investments involving certain 
elements of rail infrastructure. These included, in particular:  
 railway stations:  
 Warszawa Centralna, 
 Warszawa Wschodnia, 
 Wrocław Główny, 
 Poznań Główny; 
 railway stops:  
 Warszawa Stadion, 
 Gdańsk Stadion Expo, 
 Wrocław Stadion.  
 
4.3. Road infrastructure 
The amounts spent on this element of infrastructure were by far the most substantial. The 
data quoted at the beginning of this chapter show that the outlays on roads are greater than 
the total of all other infrastructure projects. Among the most important road infrastructure 
undertakings carried out as part of the preparations for Euro 2012 are the expressways, 
including motorways and ring roads. They contributed to reduced journey times, sometimes 
by as much as several hours; for example, A2 motorway with S8 expressway reduced the 
time of journey from Berlin to Warsaw from seven hours to four and a half hours. 
Furthermore, the investments improved the safety on Polish roads. 
Since 2007, the number of kilometres of completed roads has increased radically (Figure 
3.4). Particular acceleration of this process was observed in 2012, when nearly 1000 
kilometres of expressways were put in operation in Poland. This is an unprecedented case in 
our country. It may be worth comparing this number with the total length of all expressways 
in Poland put in operation until and including 2011. There were 1738 kilometres of such 
roads, which is only 82% more than in 2012 alone. Meanwhile, from 2008 to the end of 2012 
the motorway network was extended by 885 kilometres, and other expressway network – by 
812 kilometres. Compared with the situation as of the end of 2007, there was a 171% 
increase in length. It was largely due to the organisation of UEFA European Championships. 
In this context, the Euro effect will continue to be discernible for a few more years. This is 
because of the roads whose construction began before the tournament, but was not 
completed before the end of 2012. General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways 
(GDDKiA) plans to put in operation an additional 64 kilometres of motorways and 300 
kilometres of other expressways in 2013-2014 in the aftermath of Euro 2012 in Poland. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Development of the road network in Poland in 2008-2012 [km] 
Source: own compilation based on GDDKiA data. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The adopted list of infrastructural undertakings executed as part of Euro 2012 preparations included 
219 projects divided according to the urgency criterion into key, important and other projects. 
Analysis of project completion revealed that not all tasks had been executed as planned before the 
beginning of the event. Predictably, the key projects were found to have been completed in the 
greatest percentage of the cases (76%), while other projects were characterised by the lowest 
percentage of completion (51%). The degree of completion also varied between the individual cities. 
Gdańsk turned out to be the most efficient city with 74% of all projects completed, while Warsaw 
was at the bottom of the ranking with 63% of completed projects.  
Even considering the high percentage of incomplete infrastructural projects, it is worth emphasising 
that Euro 2012 became a catalyst of important changes, especially with respect to broadly defined 
transport infrastructure. It is particularly striking in the case of road infrastructure. In 2012 alone 953 
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kilometres of expressways were completed. For comparison, by 2011 only slightly over 1700 
kilometres of such roads had been built. What is important, the effects of Euro 2012 will still be 
noticeable at least until the end of 2014, when all projects undertaken in connection with the event 
will have been completed. 
Such considerable infrastructural needs of Poland necessitated massive outlays. Euro 2012 proved to 
be the most expensive of the UEFA European Championships organised in the 21st century and, in all 
likelihood, in the whole history of the tournament. A highly disadvantageous fact for our country was 
the complete absence of commitment of private funds in the financing of the preparations. The 
public-private partnership program, in which high hopes had been placed in connection with the 
organisation of Euro 2012, turned out to be a total failure. It is noteworthy that it is an 
unprecedented case of financing a sporting event of this type exclusively from public sources. 
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